Table of Contents
Monarchy
A monarchy is a political system in which the head-of-state inherits his position from a previous head-of-state, this is usually in the form of a son inheriting it from his father.
Historical monarchies varied quite a bit in how they were arranged, to the point that itās something of a meaningless term.
For the sake of simplicity, a monarchy on this wiki generally refers to a heritable dictatorship. That is, a political system in which the head-of-state wields absolute (or near-absolute) power and inherits the position from their family member.
This article is poorly structured for now, because Iām essentially just vomiting up my thoughts on the matter in the quickest time possible.
This is also one of the major dubious ones.
Why monarchies are better
Monarchies are inherently among the best political systems.
Why? Incentive structures.
Iāll go into more detail into what incentive structures are later, but the gist of it is that human behavior within political systems is largely shaped by the incentives that surround them within that system.
An incentive is basically something that encourages and/or discourages certain behaviors.
For example: ice on the road will discourage you from running and encourage you to walk carefully.
Now you just need to apply that thinking to political systems.
Incentives
Itās by looking at things like this that the superiority of the heritable dictatorship becomes painfully obvious in comparison to every other political system. But to keep things simple, Iāll focus on the topic of taxes.
In both monarchies and republics, the rulers are paid in taxes which are levied from the citizenry of the state they are the rulers of.
In both cases, the rulers have an incentive to extract as much money as possible, so they can spend it on whatever the Hell they want. This is undeniable. However, the incentives in a monarchy are quite different, which leads to different results.
The monarchās position will be inherited by their son. That means that they have an incentive to leave stuff for that son, so the son can spend the money on stuff that they want.
Thereās an extra incentive running around here too, which is the incentive to make the people wealthier. Because people who are wealthier will pay you more in taxes. Sure, you can raise taxes, but that can have the unintended effect of making the people poorer, meaning itās something that will only benefit you in the short-term.
In a republic, where all positions are appointed or elected or fought over, these incentives are fundamentally different.
Because your position is inherently temporary, and you still want money to spend on stuff, you are actually incentivized to raise taxes, because the long-term doesnāt matter to you (by then youāll have been replaced). That also means you have a strong incentive to extract as much wealth as possible during your time in office.
Making people wealthier (to get a higher proportion of taxes) also doesnāt benefit you for two reasons:
- You are likely not paid the taxes directly, but a specific government salary. Meaning you do not directly benefit from higher tax returns unless you raise your own salary as well.
- By the time you might start to gain that extra tax money, it will be your successor reaping the benefits (who is not you nor is related to you).
So these systems also indirectly incentivize corruption. And now you can understand why democracies everywhere in every climate, in every century, under every culture, of every ideology, and every raceā¦seem to all suffer from corruption.A)
It really isnāt their fault, itās just the way the system works.
Counter-Arguments
There are three possible counters you may suggest: re-elections, political dynasties, and lifetime appointees. Surely the incentives match the monarchs in this case?
Well, no. The incentives are still largely the same, because the most important factor (heritability) is not there.
Re-elections are, incentive-wise, not comparable to a single continuous appointment. The main reason being that you have no guarantee that youāll actually remain in that position for your entire life, meaning you still have an incentive to make the most of your current positionā¦just in case you donāt get it back again. So these are more like repeat fundraising opportunities rather than a position that you need to think through carefully.
Political dynasties suffer from the same problem as re-elections. You shouldnāt think of this as āthe son of the President becomes the President againā and more like āthe son of the President fights for the position like his dadā.
Lifetime appointments look pretty sensible on the surface, except theyāre missing the heritability aspect again, meaning you are still lacking the most important incentive there. A lifetime appointee actually operates under the same incentives as temporary appointees, just that they spread it out over a longer period of time. That does mean that they are theoretically better than temporary appointees (whose level of destructive pilfering is directly proportional to how little time they have in office), but this is like choosing whether you prefer to have your hand cut off, or your entire arm.
At this point you may try to bring out the argument that under a republic, it shouldnāt matter, because if the men are good then the system will function. Purely statistically, it is easier to find a single good man to be king than to find over 200 good men to be senators, so this argument is irrelevant.
Morality Counter-argument
But it does lead into another argument, which is related to the morality of the people involved.
Here, Iām sad to say, that the actual morality of the rulers is largely irrelevant due to the incentives involved.
Even if you want to be a good politician in a democracy, the system still incentivizes you to take as much for yourself as possible in the shortest amount of time possible. How you do it is largely up to preference. Do you prefer to take it via the founding of a new government agency or social service? Or do you prefer to surreptitiously steal the funds? Naturally, you can choose not to do this, but then you are the only one in the government not doing it.
In a monarchy, though, the system actively rewards patience, long-term thinking and being careful. You would have to possess Boomer-level sociopathic short-term thinking to screw up in a monarchy, with how the incentives work. Iām not saying itās impossible, just that even a selfish ruler has strong incentives in place to be responsible with their cash.
Thatās the point Iām making: in a republic, the most upright and moral gentlemen you will ever meet is strongly encouraged to take as much for themselves as possible, while in a monarchy, the most selfish man is strongly encouraged to hold back.
Besides the heritability aspect, there isnāt much else that makes monarchies inherently better than other systems.
Amusingly, this also implies that the Vanguard Party should have been a Vanguard Tsar.
Now for another note on the ādictatorshipā part of āheritable dictatorshipā. Yes, North Korea is functionally a monarchy, because the position of head-of-state is inherited within a dynasty. Considering what Iāve said above, this may have some somewhat unsettling implications about the longevity and long-term trajectory of North Korea, so Iāll just move on.
Monarchies really are just dictatorships with different terminology. To really get this across, one of the most monarchical monarchies that most people think of is the Roman Empire. But to the people living under that Empire, they would have just perceived it like a dictatorship. The only reason we think of it as a monarchy rather than as a dictatorship is because it lasted so long that its symbols became monarchical.
Distribution of Power
Iāll probably move this section into the article on Democracy at some point, but for now it stays here.
You may concede that republican systems actively encourage corruption⦠but! you tell me, these systems also disincentivize corruption because of the distribution of power. Those senators can tattle on each-other, which serves as a strong-enough deterrent to prevent it.
The obvious counter here is that if this really were a strong-enough deterrent, then corruption would be rarer than it actually is. But thereās actually a stronger counter.
Republican systems donāt just actively encourage corruption, but encourage cooperative corruption. Think about it like this: you are in on it, and everybody knows it. Why do they know it? Because theyāre also in on it. Everyone is in on it. Why would you, then, ever reveal them? Because then they can just point the finger at you too. Thus: a happy agreement.
Thatās also why corruption scandals typically involve something a little more than just the corruption. They are still not fond of each-other and competing, but they all understand what kind of system theyāre working within.
Itās a bit like how two armies that despise each-other will work together to fight off an opposing army, yet still take pot shots at each-other.
So you have politicians that are all actively taking from the people at all times, and actively making that taking more efficient as time goes on. Why do you think taxes continue going up? Why do you think they continue inflating currencies? Why do you think they keep selling social services that are barely functional? Itās really obvious once you look at the incentives.
Aristocracies & More
These incentives also show why aristocratic states are inherently better too. To clarify, Iām talking about states in which noble families own a lot of land and also get a share of the taxes.
Because these families inherit land (including everything on it, and the taxes from the people living there), they have strong incentives to develop it, because thatāll earn them more money in the long-term. There are also incentives related to things like prestige, but letās put that aside for now.
This also perfectly explains why almost no elites in the modern West are loyal at all. Because their inheritance can be taxed or seized at any time. That provides a strong incentive to look outside of the state to, yāknow, flee to if need be. Or stab it in the back if need be. Itās perfectly rational and understandable at that point.
The ones still loyal to the dƩcadent and the corrupt West are the real suckers.